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Abstract
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and
weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters
to select a single first-choice candidate and approve of any other number of candidates, where k
denotes the relative weight given to a first choice; this system is essentially a hybrid of plurality
and approval. Our primary goal is to characterize the behavior of beta(k) for any value of k. Under
certain reasonable assumptions, beta(k) can be made to mimic plurality or approval voting in the
event of a single winner while potentially breaking ties otherwise. Under the assumption that
voters are honest, we show that it is possible to find the values of k for which a given candidate
will win the election if the respective approval and plurality votes are known. Finally, we show
how some of the commonly used voting system criteria are satisfied by beta(k).
Introduction
Plurality is a popular voting system where each voter votes for exactly one candidate; close
to a third of all countries use plurality for government elections (Ace Project, n.d.). One major
drawback of plurality is that it tends to force a two-party system as a result of Duverger’s Law
(Riker 1982, 753). This makes third-party candidates practically noncontenders in plurality sys-
tems. Another issue with plurality arises in elections with more than two candidates. In such cases,
a candidate who does not have a majority of the votes may still be elected, as may a candidate
who is less preferred overall than other candidates (Brams and Fishburn, 2007, 1-3). In particular,
plurality can at times elect more extremist candidates in elections when there are more than two
candidates since a candidate does not need a simple majority of the votes to win such an election.
This is seen as a problem with plurality by critics. Approval voting is an alternative system where
voters may approve of any number of candidates. It has been adopted by several professional
groups including the American Mathematical Society and the American Statistical Association
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(Karlin and Peres, 2017, 223). One clear advantage of approval voting is that minority candidates
actually stand a chance to win (Brams and Fishburn, 2007, 7). While approval does not suffer
from Duverger’s Law as does plurality, approval is not a Pareto-efficient system; a candidate who is
unanimously preferred to another candidate is not guaranteed to have a higher approval score (we
show this in sub-section 4.4). This is mainly due to the fact that, under approval, voters cannot
express the degree to which they prefer one candidate over another. Although there is a scarcity
of empirical evidence on the efficacy of approval voting, some critics believe that it promotes more
centrist candidates than plurality (Brams and Fishburn, 2007, 10; Cox, 1985, 118).
We have developed a new voting system, called beta(k), that we believe can function as a
reasonable hybrid of plurality and approval. Under beta(k), a voter may approve of candidates
while also denoting their top preference. In this system, approvals have a weight of 1 while first-
choice votes are weighted by k ≥ 1. We believe that this system maintains the benefits of approval
voting and mitigates some of the potential drawbacks. Introducing the additional weight for
first-choice preferences gives voters more options for expressing their levels of preference and could
discourage candidates from simply taking moderate stances on all issues. One of our goals is to find
how the value of k affects the outcome of a beta(k) election. We make the reasonable assumptions
that any voter who would approve of a candidate in an approval election would approve of that
candidate in a beta(k) election, and that any voter who would vote for a candidate in a plurality
election would denote that candidate as their first-choice in a beta(k) election. We find values of k
that guarantee a beta(k) winner to agree with a plurality winner or an approval winner, assuming
a single winner exists, while potentially breaking ties otherwise. We also show that by knowing
the approval votes and plurality votes corresponding to a set of voters, we can find the subset of
candidates who could potentially win in a beta(k) election, and we can find the ranges of k for
which each of these candidates will win. Lastly, we compare the three systems by checking their
compliance with several common voting criteria.
Much research has been done on the behavior of different voting systems and many criteria
have been developed to determine which systems function "better." In general, while the concept
of better and worse voting systems depends on criteria being checked, we believe that some of the
most desirable properties are non-dictatorship, monotonicity, unanimity, and Pareto-efficiency (all
of which we formally define in section 4).
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1 Summary of relevant research
Brams and Fishburn have speculated that some elections would have had quite different results
had approval been used instead of plurality (Brams and Fishburn, 2007, 59-69). Karlin and Peres
have shown previously that approval and plurality are monotonic (Karlin and Peres, 2017, 221-
224). One issue frequently discussed by theorists is the possibility of voting strategically. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that no system (except dictatorship) is strategy-proof when
there are more than two candidates, a famous result from the 1970s that is proven elegantly
in (Karlin and Peres, 2017, 226-228). There is theoretical and experimental research on voting
strategies for plurality and approval. In a plurality system where voters act strategically, both
the Condorcet Winner and Condorcet Loser Criteria are violated (Niou, 2001, 225). However, a
recent experimental study with students at New York University suggests that plurality is less
manipulable and more socially efficient than approval (Bassi, 2015, 77).
2 Basic Definitions
Definition 2.1 Let X = {C1, C2, . . . , Cc} be a finite, ordered set with cardinality c ∈ N such that
c ≥ 1. We refer to the elements of X as candidates.
Definition 2.2 We assume that there exists a preference relation for each voter on the set of
candidates. We denote this relation by ≻, i.e. A ≻ B means that the voter prefers A over B. We
assume that this relation is complete (for all candidates A and B, either A ≻ B or B ≻ A) and
transitive (if A ≻ B and B ≻ C, then A ≻ C). Furthermore, we denote the ith voter’s
preference relation by ≻i, and the collection of preference relations for all voters is a preference
profile (≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n).
Note: Definition 2.2 is based on definitions in (Karlin and Peres 2017, 218).
Definition 2.3 A vote over X is a non-zero real-valued vector in Rc such that the jth element
in the vector corresponds to candidate Cj in X.
Definition 2.4 Let k ∈ R such that k ≥ 1. A beta(k) vote over X is a type of vote in Rc such
that each element in the vector is in {0, 1, k} and exactly one element is equal to k.
Definition 2.5 An approval vote is a type of vote in Rc such that each element in the vector is
in {0, 1} and at least one element is equal to 1.
Definition 2.6 A plurality vote is a type of vote in Rc such that each element in the vector is
in {0, 1} and exactly one element is equal to 1.
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Definition 2.7 A vote matrix is a n× c matrix of real numbers such that every row within the
matrix is a vote of the same type. A beta(k) matrix is a vote matrix in which all the votes are
beta(k) votes and every beta(k) vote uses the same k value. An approval matrix is a vote
matrix in which all the votes are approval votes. A plurality matrix is a vote matrix in which
all the votes are plurality votes.
Definition 2.8 Let K(P,A) denote a function that takes in a n× c plurality matrix P and a
n× c approval matrix A and outputs a n× c beta(k) matrix B such that:
B = K(P,A) = P · (k − 1) +A.
Definition 2.9 Let E(X, Z) denote a function that takes in a set of candidates X with
cardinality c and a n× c vote matrix Z as inputs and outputs a 1× c matrix equal to the sum of
the row vectors of Z. We call this 1× c matrix the score for the vote matrix Z. The type of the
matrix used for the score is also used to describe the score (e.g. a plurality score is a score for a
plurality matrix). We call any candidate in X whose corresponding element in a score is equal to
the maximum value in the score a winner for that score (there can be multiple winners if
multiple candidates are tied for the highest score). Any candidate who is not a winner for that
same score is a loser for that score. Any time there is more than one winner for a given score, we
call the score a tie. Winners, losers, scores, and ties can be described by the type of score used to
determine them (e.g. a plurality winner is the candidate whose corresponding element in a
plurality score is equal to the maximum value in the plurality score).
Definition 2.10 A voting system (we will often refer to this as simply a system for short) is a
method for selecting a single candidate from a set of candidates. In particular, an approval
system, plurality system, or beta(k) system is a voting system that randomly selects a
candidate from the set of approval winners, plurality winners, or beta(k) winners (respectively).
3 Beta(k) Properties
From now on, ni will denote the i
th row of a vote matrix, n will denote the number of votes, c
will denote the number of candidates, and X = {C1, C2, . . . , Cc} will denote the set of candidates.
P will denote a n× c plurality matrix, A will denote a n× c approval matrix, and B will denote a
n× c beta(k) matrix; pj will denote the j
th element in E(X, P ), aj will denote the j
th element in
E(X, A), and bj will denote the j
th element in E(X, B).
Lemma 3.1. For any type of score, the set of winners is non-empty.
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Proof. By definition, the set of candidates has cardinality c ≥ 1. Within the 1× c score, there
must be a maximum element. Therefore, the set of winners is non-empty. 
Theorem 3.2. If
• Bi,j = k if and only if Pi,j = 1, and
• k > n,
then the set of beta(k) winners is a subset of the set of plurality winners.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, there exists a candidate Cl who is a beta(k) winner
and not a plurality winner. Let Cw be any candidate in the set of plurality winners. Since k > n,
we shall say k = n+ ǫ where ǫ > 0.
Because Cw is a plurality winner and Cl is not, pw ≥ pl + 1. Because Cl is a beta(k) winner,
bl ≥ bw and bl ≤ pl · k + (n− pl).
Then
bl ≤ (pl)(n+ ǫ) + (n− pl) < (pl + 1)(n+ ǫ) ≤ pw(n+ ǫ) ≤ bw.
This means Cl is not a beta(k) winner. Therefore, we have arrived at a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.2.1. If
• Bi,j = k if and only if Pi,j = 1,
• there is exactly one plurality winner, and
• k > n,
then Cw is a plurality winner if and only if Cw is a beta(k) winner.
Proof. If Cw is a beta(k) winner, then Cw must also be the plurality winner as the set of beta(k)
winners is a subset of the set of plurality winners.
If Cw is the plurality winner, then Cw must also be a beta(k) winner because the set of beta(k)
winners is a subset of the set of plurality winners and the set of beta(k) winners is non-empty. 
Remark. If
• Bi,j = k if and only if Pi,j = 1, and
• k > n,
then the set of plurality winners may not be a subset of the set of the beta(k) winners.
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Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, the set of plurality winners is always a subset of
the set of the beta(k) winners. The following counterexample disproves this:
B =


k 1
0 k

 , P =


1 0
0 1



Lemma 3.3. If
• Ai,j = 1 if Pi,j = 1,
• B = K(P,A), and
• Cw is both a plurality winner and an approval winner,
then Cw is a beta(k) winner for any k ≥ 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let Cl be any other candidate in X. pw ≥ pl and aw ≥ al.
Thus, A’s score under beta(k) is kpw + (aw − pw), while B’s score under beta(k) is kpl + (al − pl).
A wins beta(k) if
kpw + (aw − pw) ≥ kpl + (al − pl).
This is equivalent to the condition
k ≥
al − aw + pw − pl
pw − pl
= 1 +
al − aw
pw − pl
.
Because al − aw is negative and pw − pl is positive, W wins for any k ≥ 1. 
Corollary 3.3.1. Under the same assumptions, suppose X = {C1, C2}, candidate C1 is a
plurality winner, and C2 is an approval winner.
C1 is the beta(k) winner if
k > 1 +
a2 − a1
p1 − p2
.
C2 is the beta(k) winner if
k < 1 +
a2 − a1
p1 − p2
.
C1 and C2 are both beta(k) winners if
k = 1 +
a2 − a1
p1 − p2
.
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Corollary 3.3.2. For any set of candidates X = {C1, C2, . . . , Cc}, if Cw has a higher score than
Cl under both approval and plurality votes, then Cl cannot have the highest score under beta(k)
for any k ≥ 1.
Proof. Assume a candidate Cw has a higher score under plurality and approval votes than Cl. As
shown in the lemma, this implies that Cw has a higher beta(k) score than Cl for all k > 1, so Cl
cannot be a beta(k) winner.

Theorem 3.4. Given a set of candidates {C1, C2, . . . , Cc}, let Y denote the subset of candidates
{C1, C2, . . . , Cr} (WLOG) that can win a beta(k) election given a value of k ≥ 1 where n is the
number of voters. Suppose (again, WLOG) p1 < p2 < . . . < pr. Then ar < ar−1 < . . . < a1.
Conversely, if (again, WLOG) a1 < a2 < . . . < ar, then pr < pr−1 < . . . < p1.
Proof. Suppose there exists a different ordering of the approval scores. Then for some pair
Ci, Cj(i 6= j), pi > pj and ai > aj or pi < pj and ai < aj . Then, Ci or Cj would not be a
potential beta(k) winner, hence not in Y.
To clarify, let p1 < p2 < . . . < pr. If the approval ordering is not the exact reverse of the plurality
ordering i.e. there exists Ci, Cj such that pi < pj and ai < aj . Then Cj is not a potential winner
by Corollary 3.3.2.
By a similar argument, it is not hard to prove the other direction. 
Lemma 3.5. Suppose as in Theorem 3.4 that Y is the subset {C1, . . . , Cr} that can win a
beta(k) election (i.e. for each of those candidates there exists some k ≥ 1 such that the given
candidate is in the set of winning candidates) and suppose that r > 2. Suppose that
p1 < p2 < . . . < pr (hence a1 > . . . > ar). Then the following series of inequalities holds:
a1 − a2
p2 − p1
≤
a2 − a3
p3 − p2
≤ . . . ≤
ar−1 − ar
pr − pr−1
.
Proof. Suppose that Y is the subset {C1, ..., Cr} that can win a beta(k) election and r > 2. We
will proceed to prove this series of inequalities by induction.
Consider the base case. Since C2 is a potential winner, that implies that there exists a k such
that b2 ≥ b1 and b2 ≥ b3. Thus we get the system of inequalities


k · p2 + a2 − p2 ≥ k · p1 + a1 − p1
k · p2 + a2 − p2 ≥ k · p3 + a3 − p3,
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which is equivalent to
1 +
a1 − a2
p2 − p1
≤ k ≤ 1 +
a2 − a3
p3 − p2
.
Thus, we must have
a1 − a2
p2 − p1
≤
a2 − a3
p3 − p2
.
Otherwise there would not exist any k for which candidate C2 could win, contradicting the initial
assumption.
Now choose w such that w < r and suppose that
a1 − a2
p2 − p1
≤ . . . ≤
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
.
Since we assume that Cw is a potential winner, there exists a k such that bw > bw−1 and
bw > bw+1. This gives us the system of inequalities


k · pw + aw − pw ≥ k · pw−1 + aw−1 − pw−1
k · pw + aw − pw ≥ k · pw+1 + aw+1 − pw+1,
which is equivalent to
1 +
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
≤ k ≤ 1 +
aw − aw+1
pw+1 − pw
.
Thus, a k such that Cw is a potential winner exists only if
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
≤
aw − aw+1
pw+1 − pw
.
This completes the proof by induction. 
Theorem 3.6. Suppose as in the above Lemma we have potential candidates {C1, . . . , Cr} with
r > 2. Then candidate Cw is a beta(k) winner if and only if
1 +
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
≤ k ≤ 1 +
aw − aw+1
pw+1 − pw
.
If w = 1 or w = r, then the left or the right inequality (respectively) should be omitted.
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Proof. (⇒)
For candidate Cw to be a beta(k) winner, the equation
k · pw + aw − pw ≥ k · pj + aj − pj
must be satisfied for all j 6= w.
To establish the lower bound for k, consider all integers l such that 1 ≤ l < w. We must have
k · pw + aw − pw ≥ k · pl + al − pl.
Equivalently,
k ≥ 1 +max{
al − aw
pw − pl
|1 ≤ l < w}.
Notice however, that by the previous Lemma, al−aw
pw−pl
≤ aw−1−aw
pw−pw−1
for all such l, thus
k ≥ 1 +
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
.
To establish the upper bound, we use a similar calculation but for g where w < g ≤ r. For Cw to
win, we need k so that
k ≤ 1 +min{
aw − ag
pg − pw
|w < g ≤ r}.
Again, the previous Lemma implies that
ag−aw
pw−pg
≥ aw+1−aw
pw−pw+1
for all such g, thus
k ≤ 1 +
aw − aw+1
pw+1 − pw
.
Therefore, Cw is a beta(k) winner whenever
1 +
aw−1 − aw
pw − pw−1
≤ k ≤ 1 +
aw − aw+1
pw+1 − pw
.
Of course, if w = 1 then the lower bound for k is just 1 and if w = r then there is no upper
bound for k.
(⇐)
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that Cw is a beta(k) winner and there exist l, w ∈ N such
that 1 ≤ l < w and 1 + aw−al
pl−pw
> k.
If 1 + aw−al
pl−pw
> k, then k · pw − pw + aw < k · pl − pl + al.
However, this contradicts Cw being a beta(k) winner.
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Similarly, suppose that Cw is a beta(k) winner and there exist w, g ∈ N such that w < g ≤ r and
k > 1 +
ag−aw
pw−pg
.
If k > 1 +
ag−aw
pw−pg
, then k · pw − pw + aw < k · pg − pg + ag.
Again, this contradicts Cw being a beta(k) winner.

Theorem 3.7. If
• Ai,j = 1 if and only if Bi,j 6= 0, and
• 1 ≤ k < 1 + 1
n
,
then the set of beta(k) winners is a subset of the set of approval winners.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, there exists a candidate Cl who is a beta(k) winner
and not an approval winner. If Cw is any approval winner, then aw ≥ al + 1 and bw ≥ aw, but
bw ≤ bl ≤ al · (k) < al(1 +
1
n
) ≤ aw. This is a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.7.1. If
• Ai,j = 1 if and only if Bi,j 6= 0,
• there exists exactly one approval winner, and
• 1 ≤ k < 1 + 1
n
,
then Cw is a beta(k) winner if and only if Cw is an approval winner.
Proof. If Cw is a beta(k) winner, then Cw must also be the approval winner as the set of beta(k)
winners is a subset of the set of approval winners.
If Cw is the approval winner, then Cw must also be a beta(k) winner because the set of beta(k)
winners is a subset of the set of approval winners and the set of beta(k) winners is non-empty. 
Remark. If
• Ai,j = 1 if and only if Bi,j 6= 0, and
• 1 ≤ k < 1 + 1
n
,
then the set of approval winners may not be a subset of the set of beta(k) winners.
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Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, the set of approval winners is always a subset of
the set of the beta(k) winners. The following counterexample disproves this:
B =


k 1
k 1

 , A =


1 1
1 1



4 Voting Criteria
4.1 Non-dictatorship
Definition 4.1 A voting system is a dictatorship if there exists a vote whose maximum value
always corresponds to a winning candidate under that system.
Observation: beta(k) with at least 3 votes, is a non-dictatorship.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume this is a dictatorship. This means there exists nj
such that the maximum value in this vector always corresponds to the beta(k) winner. WLOG,
suppose the maximum value in nj corresponds to the w
th candidate. Suppose for all np 6= nj , k
points are assigned to the lth candidate and 0 points are assigned to the wth candidate.
Then bl > bw and we have arrived at a contradiction. 
Note: Since approval is equivalent to beta(1), this shows that approval is also a non-dictatorship.
Under this construction, multiple winners cannot be selected for a fixed set of plurality votes.
Furthermore, since plurality winners agree with beta(k) winners whenever k > n, this shows that
plurality is also a non-dictatorship (since n > 2 and all but one of the voters vote for nj not ni,
the plurality winner is unique).
4.2 Monotonicity
Definition 4.2 A voting system is monotonic if increasing a value in a vote corresponding to a
winning candidate cannot make that candidate lose. Similarly, in a monotonic system, decreasing
the value in a vote for a losing candidate cannot make that candidate win.
Observation: beta(k) is a monotonic voting system.
Proof. WLOG, assume that beta(k) selects the wth candidate. Then bw > bl for all l 6= w.
Suppose that the nj vote vector assigns either 0 or 1 to its w
th element. If this element is
increased, then bneww > bw > bl ≥ b
new
l for all l 6= w where b
new
i denotes the new beta(k) total for
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candidate i after the vote was increased. Similarly, if candidate l does not win, then there exists
w such that bw > bl. Suppose that the nj vote vector assigns either 1 or k to its l
th element.
Then, if this element is decreased, we have bnewl < bl < bw ≤ b
new
w , so candidate l still does not
win the election. 
Note: Again, since the result above holds for all k, it holds for approval since beta(1) is equivalent
to approval. This also holds for plurality since plurality winners agree with beta(k) winners
whenever k > n (assuming that there is not a plurality tie). However, it is trivial to show that
even under a tie, the plurality system is still monotonic.
4.3 Unanimous winner
Definition 4.3 If there exists an element in X that corresponds to the maximum value in every
vote, this element is called a unanimous winner.
Observation: beta(k) selects a unanimous winner, if such a candidate exists.
Proof. Assume the wth candidate in the beta(k) votes is the unanimous winner. Then bw ≥ bj for
all j 6= w, and the beta(k) system selects the wth candidate.

Note: Again, since the result above holds for all k, it holds for approval since beta(1) is equivalent
to approval and this property holds trivially for plurality elections.
4.4 Pareto efficiency
Definition 4.4 For a set of n votes, a system is Pareto efficient if, for any of the system’s
possible winners Cw and any l 6= w, there is some voter who prefers Cw to Cl (i.e. there exists
voter i such that Cw ≻i Cl). In English, a Pareto winner is a candidate such that there does not
exist a different candidate who is unanimously preferred and a Pareto efficient system is one that
always elects a Pareto winner.
Proposition: beta(k) is pareto efficient when k > c− 1.
Proof. If a candidate receives at least one k-vote, then at least one voter prefers that candidate
to any other candidate. Thus, if we can define bounds for k such that any beta(k) winner is
guaranteed to have at least one k-vote, the result follows. We will consider two cases:
Case 1: Every candidate receives at least one k-vote. In this case, any winner will be Pareto.
12
Case 2: There is at least one candidate who receives no k-votes, so there are at most c− 1
candidates that do receive a k-vote. Notice that the candidate(s) who does not receive a k-vote
can have no more than n total points under beta(k). Among the other candidates, at least one
must have received at least n/(c− 1) k-votes. Thus, by setting k > c− 1, at least one of the
candidates with a k-vote will earn more than n points under beta(k). Therefore any winner
under such a system must have at least one k-vote.
Taking into consideration the cases above, it is clear that for k > c− 1, any beta(k) winner must
be Pareto.

Note: It is trivial to see that any plurality winner is Pareto. Such a winner must have at least
one plurality vote, implying that at least one voter prefers that candidate to every other candidate.
Notice, however, that with the bound established above, it can be shown that approval does not
always select a Pareto winner. Consider a case where there is a tie between two candidates under
approval and both candidates are approved by the same voters, but one candidate is unanimously
preferred over the other. Then both of these candidates are approval winners, but only one is
Pareto.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we derived some interesting properties for beta(k) and saw how its performance
compares to plurality and approval. In particular, for certain k, beta(k) is no "worse" than
plurality or approval from the results of 3.2 and 3.7. Furthermore, beta(k) has an advantage over
approval by being fully Pareto-efficient for k > c− 1. This result is not hard to extend to show
that if a certain condition is satisfied by either plurality or approval but not the other, then that
condition is satisfied under beta(k) for a certain range of k. In particular, if the given criterion is
satisfied by plurality but not by approval, then the criterion is satisfied under beta(k) for k
greater than some lower bound; if the criterion is satisfied by approval but not plurality, then the
criterion is satisfied under beta(k) for k less than some upper bound. We conjecture that if a
criterion is satisfied by both plurality and approval, then it is satisfied by beta(k) for any k > 1.
Beta(k) could be a good alternative to approval or plurality in elections where the number of
voters is large and the number of candidates is small. In such cases, one could choose a k large
enough to guarantee Pareto results and this k would still be small enough that the beta(k) would
be similar to approval.
There are further ways to determine the viability of beta(k). This would include checking whether
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it satisfies other common voting criteria (i.e. Condorcet-winner, consistency, et cetera) and seeing
how it performs in Monte Carlo simulations. Additionally, it would be interesting to see what
possible voting strategies exist for beta(k) and how they affect the outcome of beta(k) elections.
A method for determining rational voter strategies may be found in (Myerson and Weber, 1993).
6 Bibliography
Ace Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network. (Accessed January 2019) First Past the Post
(FPTP). Available at http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd01.htm
Bassi, Anna (2015) Voting Systems and Strategic Manipulation: An Experimental Study.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 27(1): 58-85
Brams, Steven J and Fishburn, Peter (2007) Approval Voting. New York: Springer.
Cox, Gary W (1985) Electoral Equilibrium under Approval Voting. American Journal of Political
Science 29(1): 112-118.
Karlin, Anna R and Peres, (2017) Game Theory Alive! Rhode Island: American Mathematical
Society.
Myerson, Roger B and Weber, Robert (1993) A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political
Science Review 87(1): 102-114.
Niou, Emerson (2001) Strategic Voting Under Plurality and Runoff Rules. Journal of Theoretical
Politics 13(2): 209-227.
Riker, William H (1982) The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of
Political Science. American Political Science Review 76(4): 753–66.
14
